Listed in Arkansas Register of Historic Places on 11/07/01
SUMMARY
The Massard Prairie Battlefield-Sixth Kansas Cavalry Camp Site is the sole surviving portion of the Massard Prairie Battlefield not affected by development. While surrounding development disqualifies the site from consideration for the National Register of Historic Places, the site is nonetheless associated with the Civil War in western Arkansas and the Indian Territory (modern-day Oklahoma). The battle that occurred on July 27, 1864, at Massard Prairie is representative of the type of warfare that raged in this region following the failed Federal Camden Expedition.
ELABORATION
With the failure of General Frederick Steele’s Camden Expedition in April 1864, Confederate and Federal troops in Arkansas and the Indian Territory reversed their roles. Federal troops assumed a defensive posture in an attempt to hold the Arkansas River against the Confederates. Emboldened by their successes against Steele, Confederate forces became more aggressive in their operations. This role reversal was particularly evident at Fort Smith, a fortified post and adjoining town bearing the same name.
Whether they intended to inspect the works or not, Confederate forces made their presence known at Fort Smith in late July of 1864. After helping to repulse Steele’s Camden Expedition, Confederate troops from the Indian Territory pushed up north to the Arkansas River and east to the Poteau River, and harassed Federal communications and foragers. They also looked for an opportunity to reclaim Fort Smith for the Confederacy.
In late July Confederate Brigadier General Douglas H. Cooper received a report of Federal cavalry encamped in an exposed position at Massard Prairie, five miles south of Fort Smith. This force consisted of two hundred members of the 6th Kansas Cavalry organized into four companies and commanded by Major David Mefford. These cavalrymen occupied this position to scout the surrounding countryside, provide security for the post, and graze their horses on the prairie. Thayer’s entire command suffered for lack of both horses and forage; in order to feed their serviceable horses the Federals were compelled to take the risk of grazing them some distance from Fort Smith.
On 26 July, Cooper ordered Brigadier General Richard Gano and others to attack the Federal camp. Cooper devised an elaborate plan of attack and withdrawal, complete with ambushes, and assigned various commands to undertake the different aspects of his plan. In compliance with Cooper’s orders, six hundred Texas and Indian cavalrymen gathered by dark on 26 July at Page’s Ferry on the Poteau River, about ten miles southwest of the Federal camp. Gano realized that this command was smaller than Cooper’s plan required, so Gano modified the plan by personally leading the entire assembled force on the attack. The Confederates traveled all night, arriving in the vicinity of Massard Prairie before daybreak on the morning of 27 July. While still a half mile from the Federal camp they formed for an attack.
Mefford’s Federal cavalrymen were encamped on the south side of the prairie in the edge of the timber. He posted pickets on the approach to the camp to warn of impending attacks. Those horses not in use by the pickets, or out with scouting patrols, were allowed to graze on the prairie. Thus, on the morning of 27 July the herd of horses had been out grazing since daylight, and by about 6 a.m. the herd was three-quarters of a mile southwest of the main camp.
At sunrise Gano’s command advanced and drove in Mefford’s pickets. The Federal pickets raced back to their camp, firing as they withdrew, with the Confederates right on their heels - the Confederate advance reached the camp almost simultaneously with the pickets, within five minutes after the first alarm of an attack was given. However, a report from one of the Federal cavalrymen on picket duty alerted Mefford; the approaching sound of gunfire confirmed this report. Mefford successfully formed his dismounted cavalrymen into line before Gano could charge; he also ordered that the horses be retrieved from the prairie.
Some of the Federal junior officers exercised their initiative in responding to Gano’s initial attack. On the Federal right flank Lieutenant Jacob Morehead commanded Company B. As soon as the alarm was sounded, Morehead sent for the herd of horses and formed his company so as to protect the horses as they were brought in. Lieutenant William Burgoyne, the 6th Kansas’ adjutant, ordered messengers to report the attack to Fort Smith and to a neighboring Federal cavalry regiment two miles distant. Burgoyne also dispatched ten men to hold a slight rise located to the left of the Federal camp to protect that flank.
Gano spoiled these Federal efforts. The Confederates attacked from the front of Mefford’s position, and on both flanks; Confederate Captain William Murphy Cravens wrote that Gano’s command "immediately surrounded the grove" of trees containing the Federal camp. Despite Morehead’s effort to secure the horses on the right, "before the horses could be brought up the enemy charged on us, which stampeded the herd and left the men on foot to fight as best they could." Similarly, the Confederate envelopment on the Federal left swept away the party dispatched by Burgoyne to hold the rise.
The Federal cavalrymen now had no choice but to fight dismounted like infantry. Mefford formed two of his companies, E and H, to the left of the camp; his other two companies, B and D, formed on the right of the camp. The 6th Kansas was well armed: each man carried a Sharps carbine, and there were enough revolvers on hand for each man to carry two apiece. The Sharps carbine was an efficient breechloading weapon, superior in quality to most of the weapons carried by the poorly armed Confederates. For a time, the Federal cavalrymen held their ground; Company B repulsed "three distinct charges of the enemy."
However, with superior mobility, an open prairie, and a three-to-one advantage, the Confederates quickly gained the upper hand. One Confederate reported that four-fifths of the attackers remained mounted; in an open prairie, Mefford’s dismounted men could not take cover from the mounted Confederates who could flank his force at will. The Confederates even used their mobility to counter the superior Federal Sharps carbines. Burgoyne of the 6th Kansas reported "the enemy charging upon [Mefford], delivering their fire, then retiring out of range of his Sharps rifles."
Inevitably, the Federal cavalrymen began to give way. Morehead, hard pressed on the Federal right flank, noticed that Mefford had begun to fall back across the prairie with the two companies on the Federal left. Morehead knew that he could not hold his position with his small command, so without orders he began to fall back toward Mefford. As he did so, Company B lost "several men captured by the enemy that was advancing through the timber in the center of our camp."
The Federal cavalrymen retreated across the prairie, fighting as they went; the Confederate troopers swirled around them, pressing their advantage on all sides. Mefford withdrew his men in the direction of a house on the prairie that was approximately one mile from his camp. "The men behaved splendidly, repulsing repeated charges of the enemy’s cavalry," Burgoyne reported, "Mefford … stimulating them by his example." At some distance from the house, Morehead reported, "the enemy closed in on all sides, taking many more of our men prisoners." Still, some Federal troops broke out "fighting and falling back to the house. There the men that were left were overpowered and captured."
There can be no doubt that this brief action was a Confederate victory. Although some Federal cavalrymen did manage to find horses and escape, and others escaped by hiding in the thick brush, most of Mefford’s command was taken prisoner. Federal casualties included ten killed and fifteen wounded; Cooper reported Confederate casualties of seven killed and twenty-six wounded. The Confederates reported taking 127 prisoners, including Mefford. Some of these prisoners managed to escape shortly after their capture, and returned to Fort Smith "in a very destitute condition, the rebels, according to their mode of warfare, having stripped them of most of their clothing."
Gano moved quickly to consolidate his victory. Fearing a counterattack by Fort Smith’s garrison, the Confederates rounded up their Federal prisoners and quickly marched them away from the prairie. The Confederates collected "200 stands of Sharps’ rifles [and] 400 six-shooters," which greatly supplemented their armament. Cravens wrote that his fellow Confederates took everything that could possibly be of use: "[T]he soldiers came back, especially the Choctaws, loaded with clothing and plunder of every kind. Guns, saddles, pistols, camp kettles, buckets, cups, blankets, hats, boots, and the ponys fairly groaned under their tremendous freightage which in bulk at least would often have exceeded the ponys themselves." Other items, such as tents, were burned.
The Federal garrison did react to the attack, but not effectively. Thayer sent a force in pursuit, but Gano had an hour and a half head start; after following the Confederates for five miles, the Federal force halted and returned to what was left of their camp at Massard Prairie. As for the Confederates, Cravens wrote that "[w]e got back to camp about the same time we left camp … the evening before having been gone about 24 hours."
Despite surrounding development, the 6th Kansas Cavalry camp site represents a significant surviving feature of the Massard Prairie Battlefield. The scene of intense fighting between six hundred Confederate and two hundred Federal cavalrymen on July 27, 1864, the site bears witness to an action representative of the type of warfare waged in this region. Though ineligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places, the 6th Kansas camp site on the Massard Prairie Battlefield merits recognition by listing on the Arkansas Register under Criterion A for its association with the American Civil War.